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ABSTRACT
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
of 2009 gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulatory authority over cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products and authorised it to assert jurisdiction
over other tobacco products. As with other Federal
agencies, FDA is required to assess the costs and
beneﬁts of its signiﬁcant regulatory actions. To date,
FDA has issued economic impact analyses of one
proposed and one ﬁnal rule requiring graphic warning
labels (GWLs) on cigarette packaging and, most recently,
of a proposed rule that would assert FDA’s authority
over tobacco products other than cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco. Given the controversy over the FDA’s
approach to assessing net economic beneﬁts in its
proposed and ﬁnal rules on GWLs and the importance
of having economic impact analyses prepared in
accordance with sound economic analysis, a group of
prominent economists met in early 2014 to review that
approach and, where indicated, to offer suggestions for
an improved analysis. We concluded that the analysis of
the impact of GWLs on smoking substantially
underestimated the beneﬁts and overestimated the costs,
leading the FDA to substantially underestimate the net
beneﬁts of the GWLs. We hope that the FDA will ﬁnd
our evaluation useful in subsequent analyses, not only of
GWLs but also of other regulations regarding tobacco
products. Most of what we discuss applies to all
instances of evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of tobacco
product regulation and, we believe, should be
considered in FDA’s future analyses of proposed rules.
INTRODUCTION
As part of the rule-making process, Federal govern-
ment agencies are required to conduct an economic
impact analysis of ‘signiﬁcant’ proposed and ﬁnal
rules (ie, those with an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more), assessing all
costs and beneﬁts associated with a given regula-
tion.1 2 Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) is required to
prepare an economic impact analysis of proposed
and ﬁnal rules issued under the authority assigned
to the agency by the 2009 Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA).
The act gave FDA jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco products and authorised it
to assert jurisdiction over other tobacco products
by issuing a rule. To date, the FDA has issued one
proposed and ﬁnal rule requiring graphic warning
labels (GWLs) on cigarette packaging (hereafter the
GWL rule) for which such an analysis was
required.3 4 In April 2014, the FDA issued a pro-
posed rule that would assert the FDA’s authority
over other tobacco products and issued an eco-
nomic impact analysis with regard to the rule.5
There are essentially three steps in conducting
this type of economic impact analysis for FDA rules
affecting tobacco products: estimating the impact
of alternative regulations on tobacco use, assessing
the economic beneﬁts of these reductions in
tobacco use, and determining the economic costs of
implementing these regulations. Clearly, the magni-
tude of the estimates from each step will have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the ﬁnal estimate of the net
beneﬁts or costs of alternative regulations. The
assumptions made at each step will also have
important implications for estimating the net eco-
nomic impact. Applying assumptions from trad-
itional economic theory, while reasonable when
assessing the economic impact of regulations on
many consumer goods, can result in grossly dis-
torted estimates of beneﬁts and costs when applied
to the analysis of tobacco products, given the
market failures caused by addiction and imperfect
and asymmetric information that are exacerbated
by initiation of product use, for most, during
adolescence.
How best to conduct this type of regulatory
impact analysis for tobacco products is controver-
sial, as illustrated by the range of comments on the
analyses included in the proposed GWL rule, and
subsequent publications discussing the approach
used in the ﬁnal rule. At one end of the spectrum
are those supporting the application of conven-
tional economic theory and measurement, incorp-
orating some of the advances made in recent years
for the economic analysis of addictive behaviours.6
On the other end are those arguing that the
rational choice framework of economics is inappro-
priate for the analysis of the net impact of regula-
tions on tobacco use, given the evidence that
tobacco use is an irrational behaviour.7
In an effort to inform this analytic process, a
group of prominent economists met in early 2014
to review the approach used by the FDA in its eco-
nomic impact analysis for the proposed and ﬁnal
GWL rules. This paper summarises the consensus
of this group with respect to key assumptions and
considerations for conducting this type of analysis
within the framework of economic theory. Within
this discussion, our theoretical attention focuses on
the most contentious issue—how to measure the
reductions in consumer surplus (the ‘pleasure’ that
smokers receive from smoking, measured by the
difference between their willingness to pay for
cigarettes and the actual price they pay) resulting
from reductions in smoking in response to GWLs.
While the GWL rules motivated our analysis, most
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of what we discuss applies to all instances of evaluating the costs
and beneﬁts of tobacco product regulation.
ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY ACTIONS
ON TOBACCO USE
Comparing trends in adult smoking prevalence in Canada and
the USA from 1991 until 2009, the FDA estimated that the
implementation of GWLs in the USA would reduce smoking
prevalence by 0.088 percentage points, or just over 0.4%,
resulting in 213 000 fewer smokers in 2013 and growing to
about 246 000 by 2031, given the increases in population over
time. The FDA’s approach accounted for the underlying trends
in cigarette smoking in the two countries prior to the imple-
mentation of GWLs in Canada in mid-2001, as well as the
effects of inﬂation adjusted cigarette taxes in the two countries.
Using estimates from this model, FDA projected Canadian
smoking prevalence rates from 2001 until 2009, and attributed
the difference between the projected rates and the actual rates
to the GWLs.
Recent research, not available to the FDA at the time of its
analysis, indicates that the 0.4% reduction estimated by the
FDA signiﬁcantly understates the impact of GWLs on adult cig-
arette smoking prevalence. For example, using nationally repre-
sentative data on smoking among persons 15 years and older
from the Canadian National Population Health Surveys con-
ducted from 1998 until 2008, Azagba and Sharaf estimate that
smoking prevalence in Canada fell by 12.5% as a result of that
country’s GWLs,8 nearly 30 times as large a reduction as that
estimated by the FDA. Importantly, Azagba and Sharaf8 con-
trolled for other key tobacco control policies, including cigarette
prices and smoke-free policies, as well as a variety of individual
characteristics. In addition to their ﬁndings for smoking preva-
lence, Azagba and Sharaf8 also ﬁnd that the GWLs reduced the
prevalence of daily smoking, while signiﬁcantly increasing quit
attempts among smokers.
Huang et al9 produce similar estimates in their reanalysis of
the data used by FDA, concluding that the GWLs reduced
smoking prevalence by between 12.1% and 19.6% in Canada,
implying that implementation of GWLs in the USA would lead
to at least 5.3 million fewer smokers. The difference between
Huang et al’s estimates and those produced by the FDA largely
result from two differences in their approaches. First, Huang
et al9 estimated a difference-in-difference model that pooled the
Canadian and US data for the full 1991–2009 period, and esti-
mated a statistically signiﬁcant, negative effect of the GWLs on
smoking prevalence. Second, rather than using inﬂation-adjusted
cigarette taxes in their analysis, as was done by the FDA, Huang
et al9 used a measure of actual cigarette prices that accounted
for the ready availability of illicit cigarettes in Canada during
the post-GWL implementation period. The latter adjustment is
particularly important given that, while inﬂation-adjusted cigar-
ette taxes and ofﬁcial measures of prices rose in both countries
from 2001 until 2009, the inﬂation-adjusted prices paid by
smokers actually fell in Canada, while increasing in the USA.
Speciﬁcally, taxes and ofﬁcial prices rose by 123% and 64%,
respectively, in Canada, and by 117% and 42%, respectively, in
the USA, while the actual prices paid by smokers fell by 4% in
Canada and rose by 25% in the USA. As Huang et al9 note, the
differences between the ofﬁcial price measures and those based
on the prices that smokers report paying are most likely largely
explained by cigarette smuggling, which grew sharply for most
of this period, accounting for as much as one quarter of
Canadian cigarette consumption in 2008, in contrast to the
relatively stable share of the US market accounted for by
smuggled cigarettes, which reached a high of 6% in 2009 in the
USA.
The consensus of our group, given the more recent research,
is that the initial step in the FDA’s regulatory impact analysis of
GWLs almost certainly resulted in a considerable underestimate
of the impact of GWLs on the number of smokers in the USA.
Since this estimate drives the subsequent estimates of the bene-
ﬁts and costs of the GWLs, the estimated net beneﬁt produced
in the FDA’s ﬁnal rule was also almost certainly signiﬁcantly
underestimated. While this particular error is speciﬁc to the ana-
lysis of GWLs, it highlights how failing to incorporate the
unique aspects of tobacco use and tobacco control can produce
biased estimates, a problem that may reappear in future regula-
tory impact analyses. We encourage the FDA to conduct more
nuanced analyses of the impact of future regulatory actions on
tobacco use that account, to the extent possible, for the factors
that differentiate tobacco markets from those of most other con-
sumer products.
ESTIMATING THE BENEFITS OF REDUCTIONS IN TOBACCO
USE
Once the reductions in tobacco use caused by regulatory actions
have been estimated, the second step in the economic impact
assessment is to quantify the beneﬁts that result from lower
tobacco use. In its ﬁnal GWL rule, the FDA concluded that the
largest beneﬁts will be those that result from reductions in death
and disease caused by tobacco use, consisting of reductions in
cardiovascular diseases, cancers, respiratory diseases and the
other disease consequences of smoking. In its efforts to quantify
these beneﬁts, the FDA omitted several signiﬁcant beneﬁts,
while making questionable assumptions that most likely lead to
a substantial underestimate of the actual beneﬁts for those that
were included.
One major omission is the reductions in non-smokers’ expos-
ure to tobacco smoke that accompany the reductions in smoking
in response to GWLs. As is well documented in the 50th anni-
versary report of the Surgeon General, exposure to tobacco
smoke causes lung cancer, coronary heart disease, stroke and
other diseases in adults, and middle ear disease, impaired lung
function, and respiratory illness, including bronchitis and pneu-
monia, in children, and sudden infant death syndrome in new-
borns.10 From 2005 until 2009, secondhand smoke exposure is
estimated to have caused over 41 000 deaths annually, more
than 8.5% of all deaths attributable to smoking. Assuming that
GWLs reduce adult smoking prevalence by 12.1%, the lower
end of the range estimated by Huang et al,9 and that reductions
in deaths from secondhand smoke exposure are proportional to
reductions in smoking prevalence, GWLs would result in nearly
5000 fewer deaths annually among non-smokers. Assuming the
same average value of lost productivity as estimated for smokers
dying prematurely from a smoking-attributable disease, the
equivalent reduction in lost productivity for non-smokers would
be at least $1.7 billion. This is only a fraction of the beneﬁts
that would accrue to non-smokers as a result of reductions in
smoking, given that it does not include the reductions in health-
care spending to treat the diseases caused by exposure to
tobacco smoke, the impact on infants, children and adolescents
and the value of the more difﬁcult to quantify reductions in the
irritation and other factors caused by secondhand smoke expos-
ure. In theory, all of these should be included in the analysis.
Similarly omitted from the FDA’s GWL impact analysis are
the beneﬁts that result from reductions in maternal smoking
during pregnancy. The epidemiological evidence clearly
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demonstrates that smoking during pregnancy causes a number
of complications, including low birth weight, ectopic pregnancy,
spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, premature birth and more, as
well as consequences after birth, from increased risk of sudden
infant death syndrome and asthma to developmental problems,
learning disorders and other lasting consequences.10 11 The
healthcare costs of pregnancies and births complicated by
smoking can be considerable, while the lifetime costs that result
from fetal exposure to maternal smoking are likely to be very
large. Failing to include the reductions in these costs following
implementation of the regulatory actions that the FDA can take
will again lead to a signiﬁcant underestimate of the beneﬁts of
those actions.
Another key omission in the FDA assessment of beneﬁts is the
reduction in the costs of a variety of healthcare services used to
treat the diseases caused by smoking. In its ﬁnal GWL rule, the
FDA’s estimates of reductions in the costs of medical services
were based on work by Sloan et al,12 which included hospitali-
sations, physician visits and nursing home use. Other healthcare
costs, including the costs of medications, home healthcare and
other types of outpatient care, are not included, as well as the
costs of nursing home care necessitated by the smoking-related
illness of a smoker’s caregiver. Likewise, while reductions in
some of the costs of ﬁres attributable to smoking were included
in the FDA’s analysis, others were not, most notably the reduc-
tion in the costs of injuries requiring medical attention resulting
from smoking-attributable ﬁres. Smoking is the single most
important cause of ﬁres and burn injuries. Finally, the FDA’s
analysis did not include the beneﬁts resulting from reduced
smoking in response to GWLs by smokers who continue to
smoke. While GWLs would induce many smokers to quit, many
others who are unable to quit will reduce the number of cigar-
ettes they smoke each day and/or reduce the number of days
they smoke. Although smaller than those that result from quit-
ting entirely, the health consequences of these reductions will
generate additional beneﬁts given the positive impact of reduced
smoking on health (for the smoker and others) and the related
reductions in smoking-attributable morbidity and mortality.
Similarly, assumptions about how the beneﬁts are distributed
over time can have a considerable impact on the present value
of these beneﬁts, given that future beneﬁts are discounted
heavily. The distribution of beneﬁts should derive from empir-
ical evidence. In its economic impact analysis of the GWL rule,
the FDA assumed that reductions in healthcare spending were
spread out equally over time, apparently ignoring evidence that
many of the beneﬁts of quitting occur almost immediately. For
example, there are immediate reductions in the risks of a heart
attack or stroke after quitting, and most of the excess risk is
gone within 1–5 years. Spreading the reduction in all beneﬁts
out evenly over time is likely to misrepresent the true present
value of the beneﬁts from reductions in many of the most
common consequences of smoking.
The FDA’s analysis appropriately accounts for the fact that
smokers differ from never-smokers in many ways, including
income levels, insurance status, race and ethnicity, and participa-
tion in other risky behaviours. This implies that these differ-
ences need to be accounted for when estimating the healthcare
costs of smoking, something commonly done by estimating
costs for the counterfactual ‘non-smoking smoker’, with the dif-
ference in costs between the smoker and the non-smoking
smoker reﬂecting the excess costs caused by smoking. However,
the FDA’s approach, following that used by Sloan et al,12 com-
pared costs for smokers to costs for hypothetical non-smoking
smokers, comprised of never-smokers and former smokers,
rather than comparing costs for smokers to hypothetical never-
smoking smokers. Given that the difference in expenditures for
smokers and non-smokers will be smaller than that for smokers
and never-smokers, this approach will lead to an underestimate
of the beneﬁts resulting from reduced initiation of smoking in
response to the FDA regulatory actions.
Given these and additional issues, noted brieﬂy below, the
consensus of the group was that the FDA’s approach to estimat-
ing the beneﬁts of its regulatory actions could be signiﬁcantly
improved. Going forward, we recommend several reﬁnements
to the FDA’s approach. First are points addressed above.
Following them are a number of additional reﬁnements we have
not discussed above.
As discussed above, we recommend:
▸ Inclusion of the beneﬁts to non-smokers that result from
reductions in smoking caused by the FDA’s regulatory
actions, most notably the reduction in the health conse-
quences of secondhand smoke exposure by non-smokers.
▸ Similarly, inclusion of the short-term and long-term beneﬁts
associated with reduced maternal smoking during pregnancy.
▸ Inclusion of a more comprehensive set of healthcare services,
given the omission of medication home healthcare services,
and other outpatient care from the ﬁnal rule on GWLs.
Injury costs averted by the reduction in smoking-produced
ﬁres should be included as well.
▸ Inclusion of the beneﬁts for smokers and those around them
of GWL-induced reductions in smoking by smokers who do
not quit.
▸ Modelling of the health impact of changes in smoking that
better accounts for the short-term beneﬁts that result from
reductions in use, particularly the immediate beneﬁts from
reduced risks of heart attack and stroke, as well as those
resulting from reductions in tobacco use during pregnancy.
This will lead to a very different pattern of beneﬁts than that
used in the ﬁnal GWL rule that spread these out evenly over
time. This is a problem compounded by discounting beneﬁts
over an exceedingly long time horizon of over 80 years for
young tobacco users.
Additional reﬁnements to the FDA’s approach to assessing bene-
ﬁts, not discussed above, include:
▸ Inclusion of more detailed measures of smoking in special
subpopulations given that FDA regulations can differentially
impact different population groups. For example, GWLs that
target speciﬁc populations, such as pregnant women or ado-
lescents, could have a larger impact on these populations.
Similarly, regulations related to menthol would be likely to
have a greater impact on tobacco use among African
Americans and young people, who smoke menthol cigarettes
in far greater proportions than do other smokers.
▸ Inclusion of the costs avoided that are associated with the
use of other tobacco products and dual use of such products
with cigarette smoking. While estimates of the lost product-
ivity and increased medical care costs of cigarette smoking
are available, comparable estimates for the costs of other
tobacco product use and multiproduct use have not been
developed, despite the existence of data that would allow
such estimation, at least for products that have been in use
for many years. Over time, as similar data become available
for the use of new and emerging nicotine and tobacco pro-
ducts, including electronic nicotine delivery systems, the
costs of their use should also be incorporated.
▸ Updating of the estimates of the lifetime costs of tobacco use
given that the estimates relied on by the FDA are based on
analyses of data that are more than a decade or two old.
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Since these data were collected, there have been important
changes in smoking behaviour and other tobacco product
use.
These enhancements to the approach used by the FDA will
lead to a more comprehensive measure of the beneﬁts of its
future regulatory actions on tobacco products. In the speciﬁc
instance of the GWL rulings, and in other FDA proposed regu-
lations in the future, inclusion of these beneﬁts will substantially
increase the FDA’s estimate of the beneﬁts associated with
improved health as a result of the regulations.
ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF REGULATORY ACTIONS
The ﬁnal step in calculating the net economic impact of the
FDA’s regulatory actions is to assess the implementation costs. In
its proposed and ﬁnal rules to date, these costs consist of three
key components: the costs to the industry of implementing the
regulations, the FDA’s administrative and enforcement costs and
the costs to smokers. Estimating the industry costs is relatively
straightforward. In the case of the GWL rule, these costs
include the costs of changing cigarette labels, discarding non-
compliant labels, market testing of changing labels and remov-
ing non-compliant point-of-sale advertising. Similarly, estimating
the FDA’s costs for administering and enforcing the rule is also
relatively straightforward. In the ﬁnal GWL rule, the estimates
of the combined industry and government costs ranged from
$319.5 to $518.4 million for the one-time ﬁxed costs of imple-
menting the new labels and from $6.6 to $7.1 million in annual
implementation and enforcement costs.4 These costs are far
below the estimated beneﬁts. Stopping the GWL analysis at this
point would have implied a signiﬁcant net economic beneﬁt
from the implementation of the GWL rule, despite the almost
certain substantial underestimation of the reductions in smoking
that would have resulted from the new labels and of the beneﬁts
that would accrue. Assuming larger GWL-induced reductions in
smoking, as estimated in recent papers,8 9 would produce enor-
mous net beneﬁts, given that the costs to the industry and gov-
ernment are largely independent of changes in smoking, while
the beneﬁts are proportional to reductions in prevalence.
The FDA analysis, however, did not stop at this point, but
instead included the potential cost to smokers of the reductions
in smoking caused by the GWLs—what economists refer to as
lost consumer surplus. For fully-informed, rational consumers,
consumer surplus reﬂects the difference between their willing-
ness to pay for a product and the actual price they pay in the
marketplace; graphically, this is the area under the demand
curve but above the market price, as shown in ﬁgure 1A.
Regulatory actions that reduce the demand for a product (as
shown in ﬁgure 1B) or that raise its market price (as shown in
ﬁgure 1C) will lead to reductions in consumer surplus, reﬂecting
the lost satisfaction that results from reduced consumption. In
the FDA’s economic impact analysis of its GWL rule, it applied
this standard tool of welfare economics to cigarette smoking
and reduced the beneﬁts resulting from reductions in smoking
caused by the labels by roughly half in order to account for the
lost consumer surplus.
In one extreme model in which consumers are making fully
informed, perfectly rational and forward-looking choices, con-
sumers induced to quit by GWLs would indeed lose consumer
surplus. Without knowing the exact demand function, this
surplus could be much smaller or much greater than half of the
health beneﬁts. However—and this is a key point—in this
model, there would be no reason for the smoker to quit in
response to the GWL. This is a crucial point—the very fact that
the GWL has a strong impact on quitting, as documented by the
evidence cited above, contradicts the very use of this extreme
model.
At the other extreme, in a model in which all consumers are
making irrational decisions either when taking up smoking or
while deciding whether and when to quit, the concept of con-
sumer surplus loses its normative appeal. If, for example, all
smokers are addicted and suffer the disutility of wanting but
being unable to quit, their persistent smoking has no implica-
tions for the amount of pleasure they receive from continued
smoking. Once again, however, in such a model GWL would
not cause quitting among these addicted smokers.
While neither of these extreme models is completely correct
when applied to smoking, the available evidence suggests that
the latter is likely to be closer to reality than the former. As the
FDA’s analysis observes, smoking prevalence is well above the
level that would result from forward-looking, time consistent
decisions made by individuals who are fully informed about the
health consequences of smoking, including addiction and who
appropriately internalise this information. Instead, most
smoking initiation takes place during adolescence or young
adulthood among individuals who are often less than fully
aware of the health and economic consequences of smoking,
have little to no conception of their own mortality, heavily dis-
count future consequences, and, perhaps most importantly, do
not fully understand addiction. As noted above, few youth who
are smoking as high school seniors expect to be smoking 5 years
later, but most continue to do so. Data from the Monitoring the
Future Surveys, for example, show that while only 3% of those
smoking daily as high school seniors thought that they would
deﬁnitely be smoking in 5 years, almost two-thirds were still
smoking 7–9 years later.13
Once smokers begin smoking, extensive behavioural, eco-
nomic and psychological research shows that their decisions to
continue to smoke are time inconsistent, satisfying their short-
run desire for immediate gratiﬁcation rather than their long-run
desire for good health, then later regretting these decisions.
Data from the 2002 wave of the International Tobacco Control
Policy Evaluation Project (ITC)-US Survey show that more than
9 of 10 smokers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement
“If you had to do it over again, you would not have started
smoking”.14 Similarly, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) reports that in 2010, nearly 7 of every 10
smokers reported that they wanted to quit smoking completely
and more than half of all smokers stopped smoking for at least
1 day because they were trying to quit smoking.15 Yet only
2.7% of smokers quit each year.16
These data strongly suggest that many, and most likely the
vast majority, of the smokers do not ﬁnd smoking ‘pleasurable’
and derive little ‘consumer surplus’ from smoking. Instead, most
continuing smokers avoid the withdrawal symptoms they would
experience if they were able to stop smoking and break the
addiction that most regret having ever started. Indeed, Gruber
and Mullainathan17 ﬁnd that the self-reported happiness of
potential smokers rises when cigarette taxes are increased. This
is consistent with quitting causing an increase, rather than a
reduction, in consumer surplus. Note that smoking literally
rewires the brain,18 a phenomenon not familiar to many econo-
mists but indicative of a biological barrier to smokers exerting
the self-control that is essential in the model of rational con-
sumer behaviour.
In discussing the issue of how to treat lost consumer surplus
in this type of economic impact analysis, we decided that it was
most informative to separate smokers into those who became
regular smokers before the legal age of smoking, and those who
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become regular smokers thereafter. For the former group,
society has clearly decided that the decision to initiate smoking
is an irrational decision and any changes in their conventionally
calculated consumer surplus resulting from changes in their
tobacco use in response to GWLs or other actions should not be
counted as a cost in the economic impact analysis of the FDA’s
rules on tobacco. This is illustrated by laws regulating youth
access to tobacco products, including the FDA enforcement of a
national legal purchase age of 18 for tobacco products over
which it has jurisdiction. We refer to this as the ‘principle of
insufﬁcient reason’ approach and argue that the beneﬁts to
those who started using tobacco products regularly before
18 years of age and who quit in response to FDA regulatory
actions should not have any offset for lost consumer surplus.
Some small fraction of those smokers made what might be inter-
preted as a rational decision and their lost consumer surplus
could be included. This might be set at 8.8%, given the ITC
survey ﬁnding that 91.2% of adult smokers in the USA say that
they would never have started smoking if they had to do it all
over again.
One difﬁculty with this approach is that we need to distin-
guish those who became regular smokers as minors from those
who became regular smokers as adults. For those who smoked
regularly before 18 or who did not smoke at all until after age
18, this distinction is straightforward. For those who tried
smoking before 18 but did not become regular smokers until
after age 18, the distinction is more difﬁcult since their initial
decision to try smoking may or may not have led directly to
their regular smoking after turning 18. Existing data provide
some upper and lower bounds for how to apply the ‘principle
of insufﬁcient reason’ approach. According to the 2014 Surgeon
General’s report, 77.3% of persons who ever smoked daily tried
their ﬁrst cigarette before they turned 18 years old, while
47.9% were daily smokers before age 18.10 Research on
smoking uptake trajectories shows that many adolescents transi-
tion quickly from experimentation to addiction, with variability
across individuals due to genetic, social, environmental and cul-
tural factors.19 It seems reasonable to consider those who had
been smoking for at least a year before turning 18 to be regular
smokers by the age of 18, implying that consumer surplus for
those starting before turning 17 should be ignored. This sets a
lower bound at the 70.3% of adult daily smokers who tried
their ﬁrst cigarette before turning 17. How the remaining 7%
who started sometime between turning 17 and turning 18
should be treated is debatable, but it seems reasonable to
assume that those smoking for at least half the year, or perhaps
3 months, could also be considered regular smokers by the time
they turned 18. Assuming that initiation among 17-year-olds is
evenly distributed throughout the year, this would imply ignor-
ing 73.8% of consumer surplus if using a 6-month threshold
and 75.5% if using a 3-month threshold.
If anything, this understates how much of consumer surplus
should be ignored based on early initiation. Speciﬁcally, 18 years
of age may not be the appropriate cut-off given the trend
towards increasing the minimum legal purchase age for tobacco
products. Four states (Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey and Utah,
USA) and several local governments have raised the minimum
purchase age to 19 years. If one uses 19 as the cut-off, the
recent data imply that 86.9% of the consumer surplus should be
ignored. Others have gone further, raising the minimum legal
purchase age to 21 years, including several Massachusetts town-
ships, Hawaii County, and, effective this July, New York City,
while bills to do the same have been introduced in Colorado
and Maryland and appear likely in several other states, including
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah and Washington. Using
21 years of age as the threshold would take at least 91.8% of
the consumer surplus off the table, given the recent data on age
at initiation and assuming that anyone smoking for more than
6 months before turning 21 is considered a regular smoker.
For smokers who started smoking after reaching the legal age,
it is harder to assume that their initiation decisions are com-
pletely irrational. This does not mean that the assumption is
Figure 1 (A) The area under the demand curve but above the market price. (B) Regulatory actions that reduce the demand for a product.
(C) Regulatory actions that raise the market price of a product.
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necessarily wrong, but that the legal status of smoking suggests
that society views adults as making rational, informed decisions
to start. If these smokers are truly making fully informed,
rational decisions, it is unlikely that the initially proposed GWLs
would impact their smoking, given that the labels would not be
providing new information about the health consequences of
smoking (although the negative psychological effects of seeing
the graphic images might lead some smokers on the margin to
quit). However, new research demonstrates that smokers do not
truly fully understand the health consequences of smoking.20
Further, the fact that new evidence is continuously emerging
about the diseases caused by smoking suggests that it is impos-
sible to say that existing smokers are making fully informed
decisions. For example, the 2014 Surgeon General’s report for
the ﬁrst time identiﬁed smoking as causally linked to colorectal
and liver cancer, macular degeneration, tuberculosis, diabetes,
erectile dysfunction, rheumatoid arthritis and immune function,
while also suggesting that active smoking caused breast and
prostate cancer and asthma in adults.10 Each of these conclu-
sions postdates planning of the original set of GWLs and hence
is not included among them. However, these new ﬁndings could
be presented in future GWLs.
To the extent that rational smokers change their behaviour in
response to information conveyed by GWLs, it is unlikely that
this would make them worse off because of the loss of the
pleasure they received from smoking decisions made with
imperfect, incomplete information. Indeed, to the extent that
the labels are effective in moving some smokers to successfully
quit—something most want to do and that more than half try to
do every year—the reductions in smoking that result should be
treated as a beneﬁt rather than a cost that offsets the health ben-
eﬁts that result from quitting. The GWL-prompted decision to
quit reﬂects the smoker’s conclusion that he or she derives more
utility by not smoking than by smoking. This is consistent with
the analysis of Gruber and Mullainathan.17
For adult initiators, our consensus is that the larger failure is
their inability to quit, even when that is their long-run plan—
what we call the self-control problem. In the simplest model,
adults would smoke even if the pleasure they derive from
smoking is less than the costs they incur if those future costs are
excessively discounted, a calculus further complicated by addic-
tion. If smoking is an addiction-related, impulsive behaviour,
then GWLs could signiﬁcantly affect how and whether such
impulses are turned into smoking behaviour. The behavioural
economics literature has formalised the time inconsistencies that
impede smokers’ quit attempts in two key theoretical concepts:
present bias and projection bias. Present bias is the tendency to
systematically overvalue immediate costs and beneﬁts relative to
those in the future, leading to impulsivity and self-control pro-
blems.21 Projection bias is the tendency to underpredict how
much a person’s preferences will change in the future; that is,
smokers may underpredict the degree to which they will value
being smoke-free.22
The costs of these biases to smokers (and thus the beneﬁts of
quitting smoking) have not been fully incorporated into eco-
nomic analyses of tobacco control regulations, leading to under-
estimates of the net beneﬁts of quitting and of regulations that
promote quitting. In its economic analysis of the impact of
warning labels, the FDA includes an estimate of the cost of
present bias for smokers. However, the degree of present bias is
assumed and not empirically derived, and the costs apply only
to ‘sophisticated’ smokers who are fully aware of their self-
control problems and not to ‘naïve’ smokers who are less than
fully aware, even though the literature notes that the costs to
naïve consumers are most likely larger.23 24 The FDA’s analysis
excludes the costs of projection bias.
The FDA, in its impact analysis of GWLs, relies on the work
of Gruber and Köszegi to calculate the costs of present bias to
smokers, ignoring the costs of projection bias. In their 2004
paper, Gruber and Köszegi23 calculate an optimal cigarette tax
rate of $5–10 per pack by assuming a certain degree of present
bias; the ﬁgures most likely represent an underestimate as they
are more than a decade old. In a recent analysis, Levy calculates
that adding the effect of projection bias leads to an optimal tax
rate of $8–11 per pack,25 considerably greater than the estimate
used in the FDA’s analysis. This implies that the consumer
surplus ‘loss’ resulting from the FDA rulemaking is considerably
smaller than what the FDA estimated in its ﬁnal GWL rule.
Finally, as highlighted by Laux,26 the importance of peer
effects in smoking causes the amount of consumer surplus to be
partly determined by societal smoking rates. Consequently, regu-
lations that lead smokers to quit can lead to gains, or ‘negative
losses’, in consumer surplus. While peer effects are particularly
important for young people,19 growing evidence indicates that
they are also important for adults.27 How consumer surplus is
affected by peer inﬂuences largely depends on social norms
about smoking. As antismoking norms get stronger, smokers are
increasingly marginalised, implying that quitting smoking will
enhance an individual’s well-being. In the instance of the
GWLs, this reﬂects the fact that decisions to quit smoking are
made voluntarily by individuals. Note that peer effects are likely
to be especially important among the low-income and
less-educated, the populations with higher smoking prevalences.
Given these issues, we conclude that nearly all of the ‘lost
pleasure’ from tobacco use, as represented by conventionally
measured consumer surplus, should not be included as a cost in
FDA analyses of the economic impact of its tobacco regulations.
The principle of insufﬁcient reason suggests that the vast major-
ity of any consumer surplus loss should be ignored given that
most tobacco users become addicted regular users before reach-
ing the legal purchase age. For those who do begin as adults,
their imperfect information and self-control problems (and the
associated psychological costs), increased consumer surplus
from alternative consumption, and the importance of peer
effects reﬂected in strong anti-tobacco norms suggest that regu-
lations that reduce their tobacco use are more likely to be
welfare enhancing than not. Indeed, the data strongly suggest
that many smokers do not ﬁnd smoking pleasurable and that
they derive little consumer surplus from smoking. Instead, most
are struggling with or avoiding the withdrawal they would
experience if they were able to stop smoking and break an
addiction they regret having ever started, facing psychological
costs from being addicted and lacking the self-control to quit.
CONCLUSIONS
Federal policy requires, and the American public deserves, an
assessment of the beneﬁts and costs that will accompany new
FDA regulations. To most Americans, including most educated
citizens, beneﬁt-cost analysis is something of a black box, a tech-
nique that they believe to be reasonably objective, comparing
relatively clear-cut beneﬁts with equally straightforward costs.
As all economists appreciate, however, beneﬁt-cost analysis
often entails as much art as it does science. Complexities in
properly identifying, measuring and valuing all appropriately
included beneﬁts and costs mean that any two different econo-
mists performing beneﬁt-cost analyses of the same proposed
regulation may include very different beneﬁts and costs, value
them differently, and arrive at different conclusions.
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Beneﬁt-cost analysis of potential FDA tobacco regulations is
made even more complicated by the fact that tobacco use is a
highly addictive behaviour initiated almost entirely during child-
hood or adolescence. The conventional assumptions applied in
evaluating the welfare effects of regulations are often inappro-
priate. In particular, the notion that a tobacco user’s
tobacco-related welfare is measured by conventionally-deﬁned
consumer surplus, or even a speciﬁc fraction of it, is inconsistent
with what science understands about addiction, a process that,
as noted, literally rewires the brain. Particularly when that addic-
tion occurs prior to the age of majority—the age at which
society deems individuals to be capable of well-informed
rational decision-making—we ﬁnd it inappropriate to measure
the area under a demand curve to deﬁne welfare. The large
majority of tobacco users themselves say that they do not want
to continue to use but cannot, or at least have not yet been able
to, quit (most having tried multiple times). Those who do even-
tually quit describe great satisfaction—utility—from having
done so. They describe themselves as freed from a burden.
The FDA’s analysis of its GWL regulation exhibits several lim-
itations that, we conclude, led the agency to grossly underesti-
mate the net beneﬁts associated with implementation of the
regulation. They are as follows:
1. The FDA estimated the impact of Canada’s GWLs on its
smoking prevalence through an analysis that ignored the
actual prices smokers paid for cigarettes. Actual prices
during the period at issue were affected signiﬁcantly by sub-
stantial amounts of smuggling, estimated at approximately
25% of the Canadian market (compared to 6% in the USA).
More recent analyses, taking this and other important vari-
ables into consideration, estimate that the GWLs reduced
Canada’s smoking prevalence by 12.5% and 12.1–19.6%,8 9
30 to 50 times more than the FDA’s estimate.
2. Even if the lower-bound estimates of impact from the new studies
had been employed by the FDA, the estimated beneﬁts would be
manyfold larger than the FDA estimated using the FDA’s own
delineation of the beneﬁts associated with GWL-induced quits.
3. However, as we have described, the FDA has substantially
underestimated the beneﬁts, omitting many important bene-
ﬁts such as those associated with reduced secondhand smoke
exposure and reductions in the consequences of maternal
smoking during pregnancy, as well as reductions in smokers’
healthcare expenditures not considered by the FDA (medica-
tion costs, home healthcare and other outpatient care).
4. The FDA further underestimates the beneﬁts by inappropri-
ately spreading them uniformly over a period of decades.
Thus, the value of health beneﬁts that are realised rapidly,
such as reductions in heart disease, is diminished by being
discounted heavily over the years.
5. On the cost side of the equation, we disagree with the FDA’s
inclusion of conventionally measured consumer surplus as a
measure of smokers’ loss of welfare when, induced by
GWLs, they quit smoking. The conventional measure may
apply reasonably to a small subset of smokers, but we con-
clude that that subset represents no more than 20% of
smokers, namely those who (1) started smoking as adults (or
started after age 17 and became addicted after age 18), (2)
are well (if not fully) informed about the consequences of
smoking, (3) have no desire to quit, and of course (4) are
somehow induced to quit seemingly against their will by the
GWLs. (Their quitting in response to the GWLs would
suggest that they value being non-smokers more than con-
tinuing to smoke. It is difﬁcult to understand how this repre-
sents a loss of welfare.)
The net effect of these limitations in the FDA’s analysis is a sub-
stantial, even dramatic underestimation of the net beneﬁts of the
GWL regulation. We hope that our review will assist the FDA in
improving subsequent analyses of the beneﬁts and costs of the
GWL regulation. Further, we hope that the many observations we
make herein that apply more generally to tobacco product regula-
tion will prove useful to the FDA as it develops beneﬁt-cost ana-
lyses of future proposed regulations. Tobacco consumption is the
leading cause of preventable premature death in our society, claim-
ing nearly half a million US citizens’ lives annually. The FDA is
charged with the critical responsibility of regulating the panoply of
products that caused this devastation. They should do so in a
manner that beneﬁts the public at a reasonable cost. The FDA’s
proper evaluation of the beneﬁts and costs of proposed regulations
is essential to ensure this outcome.
What this paper adds
▸ The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is required to do a
regulatory impact analysis assessing the costs and beneﬁts
of its tobacco products and other regulations.
▸ Assessing the costs and beneﬁts of tobacco product
regulation raises a number of difﬁcult questions, given that
tobacco is unlike other consumer goods and in view of the
limited understanding of addiction and the health
consequences of tobacco use among potential users, the
fact that most initiation occurs during adolescence, and the
biases inherent in tobacco use decisions. How to account for
these and other factors in the assessment of costs and
beneﬁts is controversial.
▸ This paper provides a critical review of the approach the
FDA used in its proposed and ﬁnal graphic warning label
rule, and includes recommendations on how to improve this
analysis in ways that account for the differences between
tobacco use and consumption of most consumer products.
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